Ivanti has released fixes for two more Connect Secure (ICS) remote-access gateway vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527, both of which were chained with the already-patched authentication bypass CVE-2026-104935 in zero-day attacks dating back to at least October 1. CVE-2026-111357 is a high-severity privilege-escalation flaw, while CVE-2026-118527 allows authenticated attackers to upload files to an unpatched appliance. Volexity attributes the chain to UTA0576, which obtained unauthenticated root-level code execution on fully patched ICS devices without deploying malware or a web shell. CISA added the two new flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on October 30, 2026.
What Ivanti patched
The two new CVEs are additions to an attack chain that already included CVE-2026-104935, the authentication bypass Ivanti patched in October to remove what it called the main attack surface. The newer bugs matter because the earlier fix did not close the entire path described by researchers.
CVE-2026-111357 is described as a high-severity privilege-escalation issue. CVE-2026-118527 permits an authenticated attacker to upload files on a vulnerable device. The supplied material does not provide CVSS scores, affected build numbers, or a detailed exploit sequence, so administrators should verify the fixed releases against CISA's updated alert and Ivanti's advisory rather than relying on a version guess.
In an advisory updated on Thursday, Ivanti explained why the October release focused on CVE-2026-104935. According to the company, a fix for that authentication bypass had already been developed and was in quality assurance for supported versions when exploitation was discovered. When the local privilege-escalation issue was found, Ivanti decided not to hold back the 104935 fix because it resolved the primary exploitation path. Ivanti said its initial disclosure and customer-protection work therefore centered on CVE-2026-104935.
That sequencing helps explain the disclosure timeline, but it should not be read as making the later flaws secondary for defenders. Volexity's account says the full chain involved all three vulnerabilities, and Ivanti has now issued updates for the remaining two.
There is also a labeling discrepancy worth noting. CISA's KEV entry uses the title "Missing Authentication for Critical Function Vulnerability" for CVE-2026-111357, while incident reporting describes it as privilege escalation. The supplied material does not reconcile the two descriptions. The CVE identifier and vendor guidance should remain the anchor for remediation.
Inside UTA0576's intrusion chain
Volexity, which discovered CVE-2026-104935, reported that UTA0576 had been chaining the authentication bypass with two other flaws since at least October 3. The result was unauthenticated root-level code execution on fully patched ICS devices. Threat-intelligence firm Defused independently confirmed Volexity's report and said it observed the first signs of active CVE-2026-104935 exploitation beginning October 1.
The actor's most important tradecraft was its restraint. UTA0576 deployed no malware and no web shell. Instead, it re-exploited the device for each command it ran. That approach removes the usual forensic anchors: there is no implant to find, no malicious file to hash, and no persistent backdoor to remove. It also means the appliance itself becomes the execution path, with every action preceded by another round of exploitation.
Volexity also reported that UTA0576 tampered with logs to conceal its activity and evaded Ivanti's Integrity Checker Tool. The supplied material does not describe the specific log-manipulation technique, but the operational implication is clear: an on-box integrity result showing no discrepancy is not proof that the appliance was untouched. Investigators need telemetry stored outside the appliance, plus independent evidence of authentication, file-upload, and privilege-change events.
The absence of a web shell should not be treated as a clean bill of health either. A file-less intrusion can still yield root access, and the attacker can return by repeating the exploit rather than by maintaining an implant.
Exposure, deadlines, and CISA's response
Shadowserver now tracks more than 5,000 internet-exposed ICS instances. The source provides no figure for how many have already been secured against the ongoing attacks, leaving exposure estimates incomplete.
CISA's response has moved in stages. The source reports that the agency added CVE-2026-104935 to its KEV catalog on Tuesday and ordered federal agencies to patch by Friday. Separately, CISA's October 30 KEV notice added CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 to the catalog. The agency's October 13 alert was updated the same day to include both CVEs, reflect their KEV addition, and revise the affected Connect Secure versions.
The revised version information is important because the supplied material does not list the vulnerable or fixed builds. Administrators should use the alert and vendor documentation to verify every appliance, including nodes that may sit behind a load balancer or management proxy.
Proof of concept and exploit intelligence
Public exploit intelligence now exists for CVE-2026-111357. A VulnRadar-Demo issue states that a proof-of-concept or exploit code has been identified and advises raising priority because exploitation is now easier.
That is a status indicator, not a technical write-up. The supplied material does not contain the PoC itself, a payload, or reproduction steps, so no exploit code is reproduced here. Defenders should treat the public availability of exploit code as a reason to shorten patch windows and to test detection coverage, not as evidence that every unpatched appliance has already been compromised.
The relevant NVD records are CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527.
Detection and mitigation
Because UTA0576 re-exploited the appliance for each command and altered logs, incident response should assume that local records may be incomplete. A practical sequence is:
- Inventory every Connect Secure instance. Include internet-facing gateways, HA peers, and any systems that may have been temporarily exposed.
- Preserve logs off-box before rebooting or rebuilding. Compare appliance logs with firewall, proxy, VPN, and identity-provider records for gaps around October 1 and October 3.
- Apply fixes for all three CVEs. Do not stop after installing the October update for CVE-2026-104935; verify the fixed builds for CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 as well.
- Hunt for repeated exploitation rather than malware. Look for unusual authentication successes, file-upload activity, privilege changes, command execution, and log-configuration changes. The absence of a web shell is not exculpatory.
- Do not rely on the Integrity Checker Tool alone. Volexity reported that UTA0576 evaded it. Use external telemetry and independent forensic evidence.
- Rebuild if root compromise is suspected. Root-level code execution gives an attacker control below the web interface; cleaning files and rotating passwords may not remove the underlying access path.
Federal agencies faced a Friday deadline for CVE-2026-104935. Other operators should treat all three flaws as emergency maintenance, particularly where the gateway is directly reachable from the internet.
Technical background
The following is a generic explanation of how authentication bypass, file-upload, and privilege-escalation bugs combine. It is not a reconstruction of the exact UTA0576 exploit chain.
| Primitive | Generic effect | CVE in this report |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication bypass | Removes the credential barrier at the appliance's external interface | CVE-2026-104935 |
| File upload | Gives an attacker a way to place content on the appliance | CVE-2026-118527 |
| Privilege escalation | Converts limited access into root or operating-system-level control | CVE-2026-111357 |
In a typical chain, the bypass provides the initial entry point, the upload weakness provides a way to stage content, and the privilege-escalation flaw provides the final jump to root. The supplied material does not specify the exact order, the upload destination, or whether uploaded content is directly executable, so those details should not be assumed.
What is clear is why this style of attack is difficult to detect. A file-less operator can avoid installing persistence, re-enter through the same vulnerability whenever needed, and modify local records to hide the activity. Defenses therefore depend heavily on external logging, network egress monitoring, immutable log storage, and rapid patch orchestration. An appliance that looks clean locally may still have been accessed remotely.
Ivanti's longer exploitation history
Ivanti's remote-access products have been a recurring target. In early January 2024, the vendor addressed a command-injection flaw, CVE-2024-21887, and an authentication bypass, CVE-2023-46805. Two weeks later it fixed a server-side request forgery bug, CVE-2024-21893.
In January 2025, Ivanti patched a remote code execution flaw tracked as CVE-2025-0282. A second RCE issue, CVE-2025-22457, was exploited by China-linked state hackers from at least mid-March 2025.
The volume is reflected in CISA's catalog: since November 2021, the agency has flagged 38 Ivanti vulnerabilities as actively exploited, including 12 that have also been abused in ransomware attacks. Ivanti reports more than 3,000 employees, a network of over 7,000 partners, and more than 40,000 customers using its IT asset management solutions worldwide.